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[The article below is the first of a two-part series. The second installment will be published next
week.] Robinson * Three months after the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN) signed their historic truce, the "honeymoon" period of the peace
process is over and the "nitty-gritty" phase of implementation is well underway. Mutual suspicions
and manipulations led to a near crisis in mid-March, as each side accused the other of breaking
agreements in order to gain advantage over the other. The timely intervention of mediators from
the United Nations charged with overseeing and verifying implementation of the accords eased
tensions and averted the near collapse of the process. Now, all sides concur that the peace process is
once again on track, and that the cease fire has become "irreversible." The government, opposition
forces and international organizations are cooperating in a herculean effort to implement the array
of negotiated reforms contained in the peace pact and to keep the process moving forward. The
112-page comprehensive peace accord signed Jan. 16 in an historic ceremony in Mexico City's
Chapultepec Palace, outlines sweeping military and political reforms. The document is divided
into nine "chapters," each of which contains a series of specific reforms and binding pacts: 1)
armed forces; 2) formation of a new National Civil Police (PCN); 3) judicial system; 4) electoral
system; 5) economic and social agreements; 6) FMLN integration into legal politics; 7) procedures
for a cease-fire; 8) verification by the UN; and, 9) calendar for implementation. The lengthiest and
most important chapter is on military reforms. This chapter contains 12 individual, step-by-step
agreements. Combined with the formation of the PNC (mandated to oversee all civilian security
matters), this chapter sets the stage for the success of all other aspects of the peace pact by ensuring
the demilitarization of Salvadoran society, and thus the construction of democratic institutions and
procedures. However, many of the remaining chapters only outline vague measures or initial steps
in the implementation of what are to be sweeping reforms. The imprecision in these chapters result
of the desire by all sides to sign a comprehensive pact without further delay is the source of most
discrepancies and quarrels that have arisen. At the time the pact was signed, signatories believed
that procedural arrangements and the precise nature of the reforms would be defined through
electoral battles and other democratic channels once the ball got rolling. For instance, the economic
and social agreements call for the distribution of land to demobilized rebel and army combatants,
resumption of the stalled agrarian reform, and an emergency reconstruction program. But the
accord specifies that economic policy falls under the jurisdiction of the executive branch. There is
therefore a built-in ambiguity, in which thorough-going economic reform can only take place if
opposition forces win power through elections or negotiate with the current executive. The sheer
number and scope of the reforms virtually assured that there would be considerable difficulties each
step of the way in implementation. Numerous conflicts have arisen since January over technical
breaches of the agreement and discrepancies in interpreting specific chapters and clauses. FMLN
and government spokespersons, as well as neutral observers, identify four principal sources of
conflict: 1) There is an exceedingly unrealistic calendar for implementation of the accords. During
the peace negotiations, the government stubbornly insisted that the "cease-fire period" (which
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precedes the guerrillas' definitive disarmament and demobilization) be as short as possible. It
rejected FMLN proposals for an "extended armed peace" which would allow enough time for the
accords to gradually take effect. In the end, both sides compromised on a nine-month "armed
truce" (February 1-October 31), whereby the two armies are to remain concentrated in specified
locales, with UN supervision of the separation and confinement of combatants to designated
cease-fire zones. The compromise means, in turn, that the bulk of the reforms contained in the
accord's nine chapters must be completely implemented, or at least well underway, before Oct.
31. As a result, the calendar establishes a time- frame almost impossible to meet. This complicates
the reform process. For example, although the full formation of the PNC will take from two to
five years, the preparatory stages are scheduled to begin in May and conclude before Oct. 31.
The schedule left just two months, February and March, for a series of steps: the appointment by
mutual FMLN-government agreement of a PNC coordinator and future PNC director; approval
by the Legislative Assembly of PNC statutes; the drafting of legislation to guide what will be a
Police Training Academy; the devising of recruitment, evaluation and hiring procedures for the
future police officers; screening tests, etc. Not surprisingly, administrative and logistical problems
led to delays for every one of these measures. By mid-April, a PNC director had not yet been
named. 2) Many clauses are so vague that they are wide open to divergent interpretations. This is
the result of inconclusive negotiations over specific issues in the rush to sign the accords. In fact,
negotiations concluded less than 24 hours before the document was actually signed. Both sides were
under tremendous international pressure to sign a pact, notwithstanding its loose ends. Details on
numerous clauses were deliberately left vague, with the understanding that they would be worked
out once the cease-fire took effect on Feb. 1. Again, the land tenure issue is instructive. The accord
commits the government to respect de facto land tenure patterns in "conflict zones" (guerrilla-held
territory) where rebels and their supporters had been farming land confiscated from private owners
since 1980 when the war began. The accord stipulates that these farms will remain in FMLN hands
until a full "inventory" of the properties in question is carried out. The farms would eventually
be purchased from former owners, or in cases where proprietors refuse to sell, new farms are to
be provided to peasants in other areas. Rebels and their supporters interpreted these agreements
to include all land located in the "conflict zones," whereas the government and the private sector
claims that the clause refers only to land area already under cultivation by peasants. As a result of
this confusion, peasants in the conflict zones began large-scale occupations of farms that had been
fallow or unused for many years. The government has accused the FMLN of politically manipulating
the accord to justify land invasions. In mid-March, the government threatened to forcefully evict
squatters. FMLN commanders retorted that combatants would provide armed protection to their
supporters. For its part, private sector representatives protested by boycotting the "tripartite"
government-private sector-opposition" forum that was to begin in February. Mediators from the
United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the National Peace Commission
(COPAZ) managed to place a lid on the brewing crisis, but observers warn that rural tensions are
bound to surface again since land inventories must still be carried out. 3) The two principal bodies
charged with supervising and verifying implementation of the accord COPAZ and ONUSAL have
been sluggish to date in resolving conflicts, and observers believe they must devise more effective
mechanisms for mediating disputes. Part of the problem is that these two bodies lack any means
to enforce implementation other than their persuasive authority. COPAZ, in particular, suffers
from both administrative and political problems. On the one hand, the Commission is simply overburdened with responsibilities, which has slowed its operating ability. COPAZ is charged with
modifying, or completely re-writing, no less than 90 laws to accommodate the reforms contained
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in the peace pact. On the other hand, the Commission brings together representatives from the
government, the FMLN, and six other parties and coalitions. Thus, the resolution of each dispute
requires lengthy negotiations among eight different political forces, which bogs COPAZ down in
tedious and often heated debate. In fact, the near deadlock in March over land tenure stemmed
from the inability of COPAZ's subcommittee on agrarian issues to reach any consensus. 4) Beyond
administrative and logistical difficulties, political manipulation by "extremist" factions on both sides
is a latent problem. The level of political violence dropped dramatically since January. Nevertheless,
death squad assassinations continue, which most sources blame on extreme-right groups who are
bent on disrupting the peace process. Persistent right-wing terror could, in turn, provoke retaliation
by uncontrollable groups on the left. Similarly, mutual accusations of noncompliance have been
flying. In March, for instance, the FMLN charged that the government had violated the clause
calling for the complete dissolution of the two militarized police units (the National Guard and
the Treasury Police) and the incorporation of their members into the army. The government did
in fact officially dismantle the two forces, but the army immediately announced they would be
converted into a new "Border Guard" (Guardia de Fronteras) and a "Military Police." For its part,
the government accuses the FMLN of "stalling tactics" in the concentration of combatants into 15
designated cease-fire zones. This relocation should have been complete by mid-March, but logistical
problems and petty disputes have delayed the process. Similarly, the army claims the FMLN is
stashing secret weapons caches, either for transfer to the Guatemalan guerrillas or for stockpiling
for future clandestine activities inside El Salvador. Despite the array of problems, there is an air
of optimism in San Salvador. Observers note that not a single skirmish has taken place on the
battlefield since the cease- fire went into effect on Feb. 1. All the FMLN's top commanders are now
inside the country, working with COPAZ and ONUSAL. FMLN cadre are opening dozens of offices
in the cities and in the countryside in anticipation of the FMLN's "legalization" as a political party in
May. And despite the delays in many reforms, others have been carried out, including the approval
of constitutional amendments reducing the army's role in society and government, the naming of
a new Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the appointment of the country's first-ever Human Rights
Ombudsman. The UN's special appointee, Marrack Goulding (whose official title is UN Assistant
Secretary General for Peace Operations), has also been praised for his timely personal mediation in
the March crisis. Goulding persuaded both sides to suspend land invasions and threats of squatter
evictions, and also convinced the army to accept the relocation of the former National Guard and
Treasury Police troops into cease- fire zones. He also brokered an agreement for both sides to hold
regular bilateral meetings to address urgent disputes. His adroit intervention not only eased political
tensions but also alleviated some of the pressures on COPAZ. All sides in San Salvador now assert
that the peace process is "irreversible." Disputes are likely to punctuate the following months, but
contention, say observers, should be considered logical and inevitable, given the ambiguities in
the peace pact and the complicated nature of the process. Most important, observers stress that the
"political will" exists among all parties to carry the process through. During a speech late last month
at the Jesuit-run Central American University, FMLN leader Salvador Samayoa explained: "The
peace process is a set of changes in El Salvador that cannot be carried out overnight. Resistance
by powerful groups to the peace accord is to be expected, given the lofty dimensions of the reform
process underway. Despite the constant problems and tardy implementation of measures, the
process is on course and we have no doubt it will be successfully concluded." * Robinson, who
has lived in Guatemala for the past 15 years, currently works for the German news agency and
consulting firm GAPA, and the Guatemala City-based Inforpress service.

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 3 of 4

LADB Article Id: 061547
ISSN: 1089-1560

-- End --

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 4 of 4

